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Abstract
This paper proposes an efficient password
authenticated key agreement protocolfor multi-servers
architecture. The authenticated key agreement
protocol is a good solution to provide authentication
and confidentiality. The identity authentication and
confidentiality are two important primary security
services for the open network environment. The
proposed scheme allows user to access multi-server
securely by keeping one weak password and a smart
card only. The client user and server will
authenticate each other in the proposed scheme. They
will agree a secret common session key for each
request in the ending of the proposed scheme.
Furthermore, the proposed scheme is based on straight
line ofgeometry and symmetric cryptosystem. It does
not use the overload cryptography operations, it is
more efficient than the previous results.
1. Introduction
Identity authentication and confidentiality are two
primary security services of the open network. It is
important to authenticate each other when the client
and the server want to communicate through the open
network. How to protect the confidential data
transmitted between the client and server is also an
important issue. Authenticated key agreement
protocol is a good solution to provide authentication
and confidentiality services. By this protocol, the
client and server not only authenticate each other but
also generate a secret session key. They can use the
session key and cryptosystem to protect the
confidential transmitted data. Password-based
mechanism is the most widely used method for user
authentication since it allows people to choose and
keep password by himself. In conventional password
authenticated key agreement protocol [1,2,3,4,5,6,12,
13,14,16], a remote user use one password to login one
server. The user should use different passwords to
login different servers via the open network by security
consideration. He should keep many different
passwords secretly for the servers that he is authorized
to access. It is not convenient and practical. There
are some password authenticated key agreement
schemes for multi-server architectures [7,10,11] are
proposed. It is an important issue to enhance the
security and convenience for the open network.
In 2001, Li et al. proposed a remote password
authentication scheme for multi-servers using neural
networks [11]. Their scheme allows a remote user to
login several servers by using the same password.
But in their scheme, each server needs to store the
weights of the classification network, and it spends too
much time on training neural networks. In 2003, Lin
et al. proposed an authentication scheme based on the
ElGamal digital signature scheme and the simple
geometric properties on the Euclidean plane [10].
Their scheme has to take massive computation and
communication costs. In 2004, Juang proposed
another password authenticated key agreement scheme
[7]. His scheme establishes a common session key
between user and server in the final. However, in
Juang's scheme, each server has to protect and keep an
encrypted key table securely.
In this paper, we propose a password authenticated
key agreement protocol for multi-servers architecture.
In our scheme, each user only keeps one identity and
password, but he can login many different servers
based on it. Each server in our scheme does not need
to keep a verification table or extra data to authenticate
the login user. The user and server will authenticate
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each other, and establish a common session key in our
scheme. The session key will be conforned by user
and server authentication. Furthermore, the proposed
scheme does not use the overload cryptography
operations, it is more efficient than the previous results.
2. The proposed scheme
There are three roles in the proposed scheme: users,
servers and trusted management server. The trusted
management server manages a group of servers.
When a user decides to login a server of this group, he
should register in the trusted management server first.
The proposed scheme includes three phases: the initial
phase, the registration phase and the login phase. The
trusted management server decides one different secret
shared key to each server that he managed in the initial
phase. In the registration phase, the user submits his
identity, password and all of the servers that he would
like to access in the future to the trusted management
server via the secure channel. The trusted
management server verifies the validity of the user and
stores some secret parameters in the smart card. He
hands out the smart card to the user. The user
authorized to access each server that he specified by
using the password and smart card through the login
phase of the proposed scheme. The client user and
login server also agree a secret session key after the
login phase. They can exchange secret information
confidentially based on the secret session key. The
following paragraphs detail these three phases.
2.1 The initial phase
We assume that the trusted management server
manage n servers. These servers are show as SI, S2....,
S,. Initially, the trusted management server chooses
system parameter p, where p is a prime. He decides n
secret keys for each server, show as ds,, ds2,..., ds,
2.2 The registration phase
When a remote user wants to login the multi-server
system, he must registers to the trusted management
server first. We assume that a user Ui would like to
login the servers SI, S2,..., Sm , where {SI, S2,..., Sm} is
a subgroup of {SI, S2,..., S,}. The registration steps
are as follows:
Step 1: User Ui send his identity IDi, password PW,
and the ID of SI, S2,..., Sm to the trusted
management server.
Step 2: Trusted management server verifies the
validity of the user. For each server S, the
trusted management server computes the
following values.
day= h (IDiED ds),
v=ij= h (PWi ® IDsj ) ) , where T is
timestamp,
Cij- duij ED h(PWi),
Dij= h(v'ij) (D h(PWi).
Step 3: Trusted management server stores the
values IDi Cij Dij in a smart card, and hands out
the smart card to User U, .
2.3 The login phase
Assume the authorized user Ui would like to login
the server Sj at t-th times, where Sj belongs to the
servers {S,, S2,..., Sm}. The user uses his ID,
password and smart card to login the server Sj as the
following steps. Figure 1 shows the diagram of this
phase.
Step 1: User Ui calculates X from the parameters
stored in the smart card. Then he sends the
message {IDi, X} to Server S.
A-b =C (Dij
Step 2: Server Sj calculates duij and h(v'-) as:
dua= h (IDi E dsj),
h(v ,) = du, ( X.
Server Sj randomly selects two values N1, N2
and constructs a straight line Li based on two
points (dua, h(v %j)) and (N1, N2). L,j: y =f (x) =
ax+b mod p, where a = (N2 - h(v'ij)) / (N1 - duI,)
mod p, b = N2 - N1 (N2 - h(v'ij)) / (N1 - du11) mod
p ,and a,bO.
Step 3: Server Sj uses the line equation y =f (x)
ax+b modp to calculate following values:
Cl = a E dug,
C2 = b eD h(v'#),
vt+1=f(h(v )t),
RI = h (IDsj, vt+ljj, a )
Then Sj returns the message {C1 , C2 , R1 } to
User Ui.
Step 4: User Ui reconstructs the straight line Ly' as
follows.
a'= C1 El CyEh(PW,),
b' = C2.e Dy D h(PW,),
Ly': y =f'(x)= a'x+b' modp.
He calculates vt+l ij based on Lj' as
V t+l y f'(Dij 0 h(PW1)).
User Ui checks h (IDsj, v t+ ij , a) and RI are
equal or not, if not, terminate the procedure.
Step 5: User Ui selects a random number N3, and
calculates the following values-
R2= h (IDi, v'+ j,b),
K=N3S v'+y",
280
Figure 1. Login phase of our proposed scheme
C3 = ER2 (N3 ,K), where ER2 shows
symmetric encryption with encrypt key
R2.
User Ui sends { C3 } to Server Sj
K is the session key between User Ui and
Server Sj .
Step 6: Server Sj performs the following substeps:
Step 6-1: R2' = h (IDi, v t+ij', b).
Step 6-2: DR2' (C3 ) = (N3', N3"), where DR2
denotes symmetric decryption with decrypt
key R2'
Step 6-3: K' = N3' 0 V'+]'-
Step 6-4: Check K ' and N3" are equal or not, if
not, terminate the procedure, otherwise K ' is
the session key between User Ui and Server
Si.
Step 7: Server Sj computes M = h (R2' , K') , and
sends { M } to User Ui.
Step 8: User Ui checks h (R2 , K) and M are equal or
not, if not, terminate the procedure.
Step 9: User Ui updates the value Dij of the smart
card with Dy = h(vt+"tj) 0 h(PW,).
3. Security analysis
This section analyzes the security of the proposed
scheme. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme
achieves the mutual authentication and explicit key
authentication.
3.1 Mutual authentication
In general, the server should verify the validity of
the user who would like to login. The user usually
does not authenticate the server. However, there are
some conspirators construct counterfeit servers in the
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User Ui Server Sj
Step i: X= Ci ED Dij
{ IDi, X}
Step 2: du h (IDi dsj)
h(vtgj)=dugeX
Random numbers N1, N2
Lj: y =f(x) = ax+b modp , a,b1O
Step 3: Cl = a E) duij
C2= b E) h(v%ij)
V t+lyj =f( h(v 'iv))
Rj=h(IDsj5v +y,a)
Cl, C2, RI
Step 4: a'= Cl E Cii ED h(PWi)
b'= C2 Dy 0 h(PW,)
Li,': y =f'(x)= a'x+b' modp
vt+ll=f'(DuEh(PWi))
Checkh (IDsj,v t+ly, a) ? RI
Step 5: R2 = h (IDi, vt+l ij, b)
Random numbers N3
K=N3E) v t+ ii
C3 = ER2 (N3, K)
I C3'
Step 6: *- R2' = h(IDi, v +ij, b)
DR2 (C3 ) =( N3I, N3")
K' -N3'F Vt+ly
Check K' ? N3"
Step 7: M=h(R2' ,K')
{M}
Step 8: Check h (R2,K) ? M
Step 9: Update
Di, = h(v t+l1.) ® h(PW,)
Internet to cheat the legal user of his secret data. It is
important that the login user and the server have to
authenticate each other in the open network. We
show that the proposed scheme provides mutual
authentication in the following paragraphs.
(a) User authenticates the server
In the proposed scheme, the user U1
reconstructed the straight line Ly' based on the
message { Cl, C2, R1 } sent by the server in Step 4 of
the login phase. He also checks h (IDsj , v'+'4i, a)
and RI are equal or not, where v is generated
from Ly'. Nobody except the server keeps the
secret key dsj and only the person who keeps secret
key dsj can get the correct duij and the same straight
line Lij with the user Ui. If h (IDsj, v t+,y, a) is
equal to R1, the user Ui makes sure that the identity
of server Sj and the two straight lines Ly and L,j' are
equal.
(b) The server authenticates the login user
The server decrypts message C3 with encryption
key R2'to get N3 " and check K 'is equal to N3 "or
not in Step 6 of the login phase. Only the people
who keeps the correct password PWi and the
corresponding smart card can generate the correct
encryption key R2 (=R2 ) to perform C3 = ER2 (N3, K)
in Step 5. Nobody except the validity user keeps
PWi and the smart card. If K' and N3" are equal,
the server Sj can make sure that the user Ui.
3.2 Explicit key authentication
Two parties in a key agreement scheme not only
ensure the participant can get enough information to
calculates the common session key, but also ensure the
participant has calculate the correct session key
between them, then we say that the key agreement
scheme provides explicit key authentication.
User Ui and the server S. compute a common
session key based on N3 and vt' y in the login phase of
the proposed scheme. By Subsection 3.1, we
demonstrate that User Ui and the server Sj authenticates
each other and they ensure that the other party
computes the same values v t+ij (v t+Ji = v t+ ij) and N3
(N3 = N3') in Steps 4 and 6 of the login phase
respectively. It is clear that the proposed scheme
provides explicit key authentication.
4. Comparison
In this section, we make the comparisons among
our proposed scheme, Juang's scheme [7] and Lin et
al.'s scheme [10]. The companson is divides into
three parts: the security properties, the computational
cost and the communicational cost.
4.1 The security properties
This subsection discusses the security properties
that are provided Juang's scheme [7], Lin et al.'s
scheme [10] and our proposed scheme. Those
security properties include the mutual authentication,
the explicit key authentication and extra memory space
require in servers. The security properties comparison
results are also shown on Table 1.
In Juang's scheme, when a user registers to the
registration center in registration phase, the registration
center not only delivers a smart card to user, but also
needs to transmit an encrypt message to each server
that the user want to access. The message was
encrypted by a common session key between the
registration center and server, each server needs extra
memory space to store this encrypted message. The
user and server ware establish a common session key in
Juang's scheme, but it does not provide explicit key
authentication. Juang's scheme provides mutual
authentication for user and server.
In Lin et al.'s scheme, each server only needs to
store their key pair (public key and secret key), they
don't need to store extra value. However, their
scheme doesn't provide mutual authentication. When
a user login a server, the server authenticates the user,
but the user cannot ensure that he does not login a
counterfeit server in Lin et al.'s scheme. The user and
server in Lin et al.'s scheme do not establish a common
session key, they should perform another method to
protect the secret exchange data.
In our proposed scheme, each server doesn't need
to maintain a verification table or any extra data. Our
scheme provides mutual authentication for the user and
the server, they establishes a secret common session
key and provide explicit key authentication.
4.2 The computational cost
This section discusses the computational cost of
Table 1. The security roerties con arison
Our Juang L H L
proposed 2004 2003
scheme
Mutual Y Y N
authentication Y Y
Explicit key Y N No session
authentication key
Server has to
maintain extra N Y N
secret data
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Table 2. The computational cost and the communicational cost comparisons
Our proposed scheme Juang 2004 L H L 2003
User Server User Server User Server
Symmetric 1 2 1
encryption
Symmetric 1 3
decryption
Modular
exponentiation 4 6
Modular 1
division 1
Modular
multiplication 1 2
Round 2 2 2 1 1 1
Message size ID + 4x128 bits ID + 3x128 bits ID + T +
3x128 bits 4x128 bits 7x1024 bits
XOR denote the exclusive-OR operation
ID denote the bit length of identity
T denote the bit length oftimestamp
Juang's scheme [7], Lin et al.'s scheme [10] and our
proposed scheme. The first five rows of Table 2 show
the comparison results in the computational cost. The
computational cost of exclusive-OR operation, Hash
function and modular addition are smaller than the
symmetric encryption and the modular multiplication.
We ignore the cost of exclusive-OR operation, Hash
function and modular addition. In Juang's scheme,
the user performs 3 symmetric encryption / decryption
operations and the server performs 4 symmetric
encryption / decryption operations. In Lin et al.'s
scheme, the user needs 4 modular exponentiations, 1
modular division and 4 modular multiplications, and
the server needs 6 modular exponentiations, 1 modular
division and 4 modular multiplications. The user in
our proposed scheme needs 1 symmetric encryption
operations and 1 modular multiplication operations.
The server needs I symmetric decryption operations, 2
modular multiplication operations and I modular
division. Since it still fast than symmetric encryption
and decryption. And our scheme needs 1 more round,
this is because our scheme provides implicit key
authentication. The computation cost of modular
exponentiation is larger than the modular division.
The modular division is larger than modular
multiplication [8, 9]. Our proposed scheme is more
efficient than the others.
4.3 The communicational cost
This subsection discusses the communicational cost
of Juang's scheme [7], Lin et al.'s scheme [10] and our
proposed scheme. The last two rows of Table 2 show
the comparison results in the communicational cost.
The security of Lin et al.'s scheme [10] is based on
discrete logarithm problem. We assume thatp in their
scheme is 1024 bits by security consideration. In
Juang's scheme [7] and our scheme, we use the
one-way hash function and symmetric cryptosystem.
We assume that the output size of one-way hash
function, the block size of symmetric cryptosystem and
the size ofrandom number are 128 bits.
In Lin et al.'s scheme, the communicational cost
between user and server is I ID, 1 Timestamp and
7x1024 bits. In Juang's scheme, the message size
transmit from user to server is 1 ID and 4x 128 bits (this
include one nonce and three symmetric encryption
blocks), the message size transmit from server to user
is 3x128 bits (this include three symmetric encryption
blocks). In our proposed scheme, the message size
transmit from user to server is 1 ID and 3x 128 bits (this
include one 128 bits value and two symmetric
encryption blocks), the message size transmit from
server to user is 4x128 bits (this include two 128 bits
values and two hash results). The communicational
cost in our scheme is much smaller than Lin et al.'s
scheme, and is the same with Juang's scheme.
Although the communicational cost of Juang's scheme
and our scheme are equal, our proposed scheme
provides more security properties than Juang's scheme.
5. Conclusion
This paper proposes an efficient password
authenticated key agreement protocol for multi-servers
architecture. It is a good solution of the identity
authentication and confidentiality for the open network.
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There are some conspirators construct counterfeit
servers in the Internet to cheat the legal user of his
secret data. Especially, not only the server
authenticates the client user, but also the client user
authenticates the server in the proposed scheme. It
provides mutual authentication and each server doesn't
need to maintain a verifier table. The client user and
server establish a secret session key in the ending of the
proposed scheme. They use the session key to
exchange secret data confidentially. Furthermore, our
scheme takes less computational and communicational
costs. It is more efficiency than the previous schemes.
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